
Enumeration / Info Gathering
Initial nmap scanning revealed a Windows domain controller with the usual suspects: DNS (53), Kerberos (88), RPC (135), SMB (445), LDAP (389/636), and RDP (3389). The domain identified asthm.local with hostname labyrinth.thm.local.
SMB
First thing I’m going to look at is null authentication and guest auth before looking at the web servers We do get authentication as a guest, but the shares don’t really give anything important. We can come back to this as a last resort to enumerate, but out of all the default shares this one probably isn’t going to be anything good.HTTP
Though on both 80 and 443 they are the same 403 result
Doing some more enumeration (both subdir and dir) we find the following:
Unfortunately, it’s looking like the same story here (unsurprisingly)
I also found this article, which is a list of aspnet_client information and fuzzing.
Regardless, we get a hit! This is a version for asp net and it appears to be very vulnerable!
Another thing I forgot to check is the SSL Certificate on the web server. Though unfortunately it doesn’t look like anything too crazy. Knowing there is a CA is interesting, and maybe we can callback to it later.
General AD Attacks
Since we have Guest authentication, that is kind of all we need to start launching some attacks. For example, we can find a HUGE list of users by rid-bruting
We can create user list with the following command:
LDAPSearch
We get a bunch of information back including Descriptions of user objects
Exploitation
FINALLY we have a password. We can spray this across the network and we find two valid logins! Woohoo!
SMB Enumeration part two
Confirming that the credentials we found work on SMB:
Bloodhound
Pulling down bloodhound data:ASReproasting
We get a bunch of hashes but none of them crack unfortunatelySUSANNA_MCKNIGHT PWNED
Checking RDP on our cred users we find we actually have RDP access w/ susanna!
This is confirmed by bloodhound (notice she is a part of the Remote Desktop Users group):
Lateral Movement
We can RDP in as Susanna and get user flag.
PrivEsc
For PrivEsc, we can actually callback to the HTTPS CA Authority! How could we forget! We can use Certipy to locate any vulnerable CA templates that may be present on the DC.
It’s vulnerable to ESC1! — https://viperone.gitbook.io/pentest-everything/everything/everything-active-directory/adcs/esc1
We get a hash for the Carey_fields DA. However, this one doesn’t work for some reason.
Instead, we have to get the hash for bradley, which is the user we saw before to FINALLY pwn this machine.
I had a hard time RPDing in with just the hash, but smb/psexec worked just fine:
And that’s it, thanks for sticking around! This box was a fun one and I learned a lot of new stuff, especially with ldapsearch! I hope you enjoyed, and of course Happy Hacking!